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Abstract 
Why are urban plans, land use regulations and construction codes implemented effectively in 
some African states but not others? This constitutes an increasingly urgent development 
concern with major implications for the environment and the urban poor. Rather than being 
explained by economic factors, bureaucratic capacity or the nature of the urban policies and 
regulations in place, this paper argues that divergent outcomes are largely rooted in differing 
political bargaining environments. Comparing Uganda and Rwanda, it presents an empirical 
study that analyses contrasting planning and regulation trajectories in contexts of similarly 
low levels of socioeconomic development and soaring rates of urban growth. It argues that 
the divergent outcomes can be explained in relation to the political resources and incentives 
confronted by governing elites, which in Rwanda impel state actors to implement plans and 
regulations while in Uganda incentivize overriding them in the interests of political or 
economic gain. In highlighting political bargaining contexts and how these change over time, 
the paper illustrates the critical importance of historically informed city-level political 
economy analysis for understanding divergent urban development outcomes. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
‘The emerging picture is shocking. The power to change and alter land use has been grossly 
abused by officials who wantonly approve structures to be built over, or close to, sewerage lines, 
road reserves, wetlands, high voltage power lines, recreation grounds, and traffic islands meant 
for road safety. The scramble for the remaining open spaces is similar to the gold rush and Wild 
West in the United States of America, and the unscrupulous methods used are no different.’ 
(Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Sale, Lease and Purchase of Land by Kampala 
City Council, 2006). 
 
‘When you go into African cities what you see is the hustle, the dust, the chaos…[the President’s] 
message was: can’t we do this differently?...We have to be orderly, we have to be clean, we have 
to be modern. It is a new idea, a new identity.’ (Interview with city official, Kigali, 26 November 
2009). 
 
For decades now, scholars have emphasized the pace at which cities are growing in Africa 
and the implications of this for development (Davis, 2006; Rakodi, 1997; Silva, 2012; Stren 
and White, 1989). Even if urbanization (the increase in the proportion of the population 
living in urban as opposed to rural areas) is less rapid in Africa than sometimes claimed 
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(Cohen, 2004; Potts, 2009, 2012), urban growth (the increase in absolute number of people 
living in cities) has generally been extremely high in recent decades (Bryceson, 2006; Fox, 
2012). In this context, the problem of how to plan for urban expansion and implement 
regulations over the use of scarce, valuable and environmentally strained urban land is 
increasingly urgent. Without some degree of state control over urban physical development, 
the prospects for alleviating the well-documented problems faced by the poorest urban-
dwellers are slim (Davis, 2006; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Gubler, 1998; Hardoy et al., 
2001; Oosterveer, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2003). 
 
The history of attempts to plan and regulate urban spaces in Africa since independence has 
for the most part constituted a litany of failure (Mabogunje, 1990; Okpala, 2008; Silva, 2012; 
Watson, 2009). Despite major shifts in development thinking in this period, the varying menu 
of proposed policy remedies did little to stem the ultimately ‘laissez-faire’ nature of urban 
growth, particularly after the 1970s (Beall and Fox, 2009).  It is, however, important to 
recognize that wide disparities exist within the continent. The former settler colonies of 
Southern Africa exhibit relatively strong legacies of planning that have to some degree been 
carried through to the present: in Zimbabwe, for example, under 18% of urban-dwellers were 
considered to be living in slum conditions in 2005, compared to an African average of 63% 
(Fox, 2013). Apartheid South Africa, meanwhile, was associated with a particularly strict 
planning regime which has fed into both relatively developed infrastructure coverage and an 
enduring legacy of social division and segregation (Harrison et al., 2008; Mabin and Smit, 
1997).  
 
These Southern African cases encapsulate the broader paradox of urban planning, whereby 
planned development in a given city can clearly be associated with both positive and negative 
socioeconomic outcomes simultaneously. Indeed, whether planning is the solution to Africa’s 
urban challenge or part of the problem remains much debated. Both colonial and post-
colonial planning regimes across the continent have certainly contributed to fragmented (and 
often racially or ethnically segregated) cities that spatially exclude the poor (Balbo, 1993; 
Mabogunje, 1990; Myers, 2003; Nkurunziza, 2006). But is planning per se the problem? Had 
those excluded areas been incorporated into infrastructure planning and subject to a 
regulatory regime appropriate for low-income urban growth, rather than simply excluded or 
ignored in planning efforts, they would be less vulnerable to public health crises, pollution, 
environmental risk and infrastructure failure today (Davis, 2006; Nuwagaba, 2006; Pelling 
and Wisner, 2009). Moreover, urban planning is considered to be rather successful in many 
Asian late-developing countries (Taylor, 2004). In the face of Africa’s 21st Century urban 
transition there is therefore a growing recognition ‘that planning is a much-needed integrative 
mechanism’ (Taylor, 2004) and that the challenge is to develop more inclusive and effective 
forms of planning rather than to give up on it altogether. 
 
To understand the potential that planning and urban development regulation hold for African 
cities in the coming decades, we need better explanations of actual cases of relative successes 
and failures of implementation beyond those associated with the particularities of settler 
colonies.  While the superimposition of Western urban planning and management models 
onto African contexts has attracted much criticism (Balbo, 1993; Gandy, 2006; 
Kanyeihamba, 1980; Myers, 2003), the fact is that ‘Western-style’ urban development codes 
are in place across much of Africa. A critical aspect of understanding the variable evolution 
of African cities in recent years is therefore to analyse empirically why, despite having 
similar planning and regulatory frameworks in place, some governments in tropical Africa 
have been more willing and able to implement these than others.  
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The challenge of managing urban growth is particularly urgent with respect to East and 
Central Africa. Although still predominantly rural, the rates of urban growth in this region are 
the highest on the continent and among the highest in the world. Data from the UN 
Population Division and UN-HABITAT (UN-HABITAT, 2011; UNPD, 2009) which, while 
flawed, is some of the only aggregated international urban population data available, affirm 
this regional trend. World Bank figures from recent years likewise place Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda consistently in the 
top twenty states with the fastest-growing urban populations globally.1  
 
Even within this region, however, dramatic differences in effectiveness exist with regard to 
urban development control. This article compares the Rwandan capital Kigali with the 
Ugandan capital Kampala, according to comparative case study logic outlined in Section 3. 
Kampala has become renowned for haphazard development and collapsing buildings (Pelling 
and Wisner, 2009), shanty settlements prone to fatal flooding and cholera outbreaks (Mabasi, 
2009), as well as its pot-holed streets, crumbling infrastructure and crippling traffic 
congestion worsened by the illegal conversion of parking spaces. Kigali, meanwhile, has 
become the envy of the region: increasingly strictly planned, orderly and fêted internationally 
as a ‘model, modern city’ by UN-HABITAT in 2008.2 This article aims to explain these 
sharply diverging outcomes.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores some of the debates around urban 
planning and land use regulation as they have been applied in developing countries, before 
highlighting the importance of political economy and political ecology analysis for 
explaining the effectiveness of implementation. Section 3 then turns to case selection and 
methodological considerations. The empirical material on the two cities is presented in 
sections 4 and 5. Each case is introduced by briefly highlighting the formal institutions 
guiding urban planning and regulation, before the divergent reality of their implementation in 
practice is illustrated with a range of empirical examples and an analytical discussion. Section 
6 concludes.  
 
2. Urban development control and the politics of implementation in Africa 
 
2.1. Concepts, challenges and a legacy of failure 
 
Although urban planning and development regulation evolved in tandem, they are distinct 
aspects of what together can be termed urban development control. Plans can be thought of as 
sets of agendas, policies, designs and strategies for physical development, encapsulated  in a 
‘two-dimensional layout of the physical form of the city’ (Neuman, 1998); urban 
development regulations are binding rules concerning ‘what is built, where it is built, and 
when and how it is built’ (Kaiser et al., 1995). Generally these take the form of land use 
regulations, zoning ordinances and building codes. Such regulations generally have the force 
of law, unlike master plans, which city councils consult but are not usually bound by (Birch, 
2008: 142). 
 
These tools were used extensively by colonists in relation to the development of cities in 
colonized territories in the twentieth century (Home, 1990; Kanyeihamba, 1980; King, 1976; 
                                                          
1
 http://databank.worldbank.org/, accessed 5 September 2012. 
2
 http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=564&cid=5666, accessed  April 27, 2011. 
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Okpala, 2008).  The post-colonial period, however, presents quite a different story. As 
Mabogunje notes, ‘the pervading impression is of the failure of governments in most African 
countries to make any appreciable impact’ through policies and plans on problems of urban 
degradation (Mabogunje, 1990: 121). Around the time of Africa’s ‘independence decade’ in 
the 1960s, urban physical planning was actually very popular both among the governments of 
newly-independent countries and their international sponsors (Conyers and Hills, 1984; Gans, 
1963). However, city master planning consistently underestimated the pace of urban growth 
and also took so long that ‘informal development overwhelmed the assumptions and 
projections of the plans’ (Taylor, 2004: 4).   
 
Consequently, urban planning fell out of favour with the international development 
community. Discourses of market-friendly, day-to-day ‘urban management’ and improved 
‘urban governance’ evolved in its stead (Lee-Smith and Stren, 1991; Mabogunje, 1992; 
Mattingly, 1994; McGill, 1998; Stren, 1993). Broader ideological battles between those in 
favour of state versus market-led development solutions thus played out with great vigour in 
relation to questions of urban spatial form. When the Urban Management Programme (UMP) 
– a collaborative programme involving the World Bank, UNDP and UN-HABITAT – 
emerged in the late 1980s, its reports generally argued for a reduction in the scope of public 
policies due to failures of top-down master planning and state-run urban development 
agencies (Bernstein, 1994; Dowall and Clark, 1996; Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992). 
 
In the meantime, unplanned urban development continued in many developing countries 
amid soaring urban growth. The intense focus on specifying the appropriate limitations on 
state involvement led to a neglect of critical questions of political economy that were likely to 
impinge on the effectiveness of urban land policies regardless of the precise balance between 
state and market prescribed by them. Indeed, planning was stigmatized without adequate 
attention to the nature and causes of the failures of implementation that made it so 
unsatisfactory (Taylor, 2004). In this sense it is sadly unsurprising that even those closely 
involved with the UMP retrospectively admitted that the programme, which ended in 2004, 
had ‘wildly exaggerated perceptions of its own self-importance’ and actually achieved little 
(Cohen, 2005). 
 
Against this backdrop, in Africa on-going problems of unplanned urban development have 
often been particularly acute in capital or ‘core’ (economically dominant) cities, given the 
high degree of urban primacy bequeathed by colonialism (Doan, 1995).
3
  In the East/Central 
Africa region, levels of urban primacy are extremely high and in capital cities there is 
immense pressure on urban land, which often soars in value resulting in the kind of 
‘scramble’ highlighted in the opening quote of this paper. The concentration of national elites 
and the location of government in such cities further raises the stakes, as the city often 
represents the spatial locus of political and economic power struggles. These considerations 
highlight the value of both political ecology and political economy approaches when 
analysing the effectiveness of urban planning and development regulation. 
 
2.2. Urban development control and the political bargaining environment 
 
Two related shortcomings have been apparent in discourses of urban planning and urban 
management in developing countries, notwithstanding the ideological swings and 
roundabouts of the past half century. The first was the failure to adequately engage with 
                                                          
3
 Urban primacy refers to the demographic and economic dominance of one city in a particular country. 
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politics in the approaches adopted by the development community. For example, in a UMP 
report specifically on the factors perpetuating urban land use problems, virtually no reference 
was made to how political dynamics affect the implementation of plans and regulations 
(Bernstein, 1994). A second shortcoming has been the tendency to generalize the experience 
of urbanization in the developing world and the problems associated with it, rather than 
analysing successes and failures comparatively. Regarding Africa specifically, this has 
unduly limited the attention paid to the highly differentiated nature of urban development 
control on the continent.  
 
Thomas and Grindle (1990) propose an approach to policy implementation analysis that is 
instructive with regard to the first shortcoming, and holds implicit lessons regarding the 
second. They suggest that different varieties of policy face distinctly different implementation 
challenges. Some policies, they argue, provoke resistance primarily in the bureaucratic arena 
because they impose costs mainly on state actors and are administratively complex. In 
contrast, other policies provoke resistance largely in the public arena because they disperse 
costs broadly among social actors, are not obstructed by bureaucrats so can be implemented 
swiftly, and directly implicate and impact on the wider public. Urban plans and development 
regulations are generally of the latter variety. As policies that evoke strong public reactions, 
they can easily become highly politicized, generating obstacles to implementation that are 
political rather than bureaucratic in nature. In other words, implementing plans is far from 
being the primarily technical exercise that it has often been conceived as in policy circles. 
 
How does this help us when thinking about comparative analysis? The Thomas and Grindle 
framework does not explicitly account for why different states would have such diverse 
experiences in implementing the same kinds of policies. Nevertheless, the implication for 
urban planning, which provokes resistance primarily in the public arena, is that differential 
implementation effectiveness would be due to differences in political (rather than 
bureaucratic) resources available to each government. Factors such as the sources of state 
legitimacy, the relative autonomy of government from particular urban social groups and the 
cohesiveness of elites, for example, constitute important political resource variables. The 
general tendency of ordinary citizens to comply with laws and rules, which may be 
influenced by all these factors, also amounts to a significant resource. 
 
Related to such political resources are the incentives for state actors to actually implement the 
rules in place. This applies both to politicians at all levels and the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
(Lipsky, 1971) tasked with enforcing rules and regulations. Like political resources, 
implementation incentives are historically and contextually specific and may depend on 
factors such as the nature of the political party or group in power, their need to establish 
credibility with certain groups, and the extent of political competition. Such political 
dynamics are frequently discussed in relation to failures of environmental protection within 
the field of urban political ecology, which combines cultural geography with political 
economy in order to understand environmental degradation (Myers, 2005). Emerging work 
on Africa in this field has stressed the degree to which democratization and especially 
competitive elections may generate incentives that impede urban environmental protection 
(Myers, 2002; Njeru, 2010: 341; 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, political economists have highlighted the extent to which political settlements 
negotiated among elites and between elites and ordinary citizens impact on incentives to 
support rather than undermine formal state institutions (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Khan, 
2010; North et al., 2009). Factors such as the nature of political competition, the geographical 
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composition of support for the governing regime and the degree to which the political system 
is decentralised all influence the kinds of negotiation taking place. Drawing on these insights 
from political ecology and political economy, this paper therefore suggests that the resources 
and incentives that comprise the urban political bargaining environment influence the degree 
to which state actors tend to implement policies and regulations, as well as the extent to 
which urban-dwellers are likely to comply. The nature of the political bargaining 
environment in a given urban context affects how policy packages that are similar on paper 
are adopted and used in a given setting. This chimes with the insights of recent scholarship on 
the dynamics underpinning policy circulation, translation and adoption (Czarniawska and 
Sevón, 2005; McCann and Ward, 2012). 
 
In contrast with such an approach, many development organisations have considered 
implementing urban plans as a technical, apolitical exercise. While theories of urban 
development in the global North have engaged with political bargaining extensively (Elkin, 
1985; Stone, 1993; Ward, 1996), until recently Southern cities have been little explored 
through political economy lenses, being primarily viewed as sites for development 
intervention rather than political analysis and theorisation (Myers, 2005; Robinson, 2006). 
There are clearly problems of viewing urban Africa through ethnocentric Western-focused 
models such as ‘urban regime theory’, with its assumption of the dominance of formal 
business interests and hermetically sealed spheres of urban governance (Gibbs and Jonas, 
2000; Painter, 2001). Yet the intrinsically political nature of processes involving lucrative 
urban land and property is universal; approach that takes into account urban political 
bargaining environments is essential for explaining urban development outcomes 
everywhere.  
 
3. Case selection and research methodology 
 
Several scholars have recently called for a new phase of experimental comparative urban 
research (Robinson, 2011; Ward, 2010). One proposed aspect of this is to break down the 
dichotomy between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ and compare cities with varying 
socioeconomic characteristics that nevertheless aim to apply similar policy solutions, drawing 
on the literature on global policy circulation noted above. It is also important, however, to 
address the parallel neglect of comparison between cities in low-income countries that are 
often misleadingly assumed to be generally alike. This paper is rooted in the latter agenda. It 
is precisely because comparable levels of economic development do not necessarily indicate 
similarity in other dimensions that comparing cities with similar socioeconomic profiles is 
important, in order to draw out the political and relational factors that account for different 
outcomes. 
 
This study follows a long tradition in comparative politics of selecting ‘most similar 
systems’, dating back to John Stuart Mill and expounded famously by Ragin (1987). Gerring 
(2007) refers to this method of case selection as the ‘diverse case’ method because it aims to 
select cases on the grounds of their similarity in many critical respects but marked variation 
regarding the outcome of interest (in this case, effective implementation of urban plans and 
regulations). Based on this rationale, this article discusses cases that not only exhibit 
socioeconomic similarities but possess other important commonalities relating to their shared 
history as part of a distinct geographic region, in line with Abu-Lughod’s proposed 
‘embedded regional approach’ to comparative urban research (Abu-Lughod, 1976; Robinson, 
2011).  
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Kampala and Kigali are not only regionally embedded but are in many ways among the most 
comparable capital cities in Africa. Uganda and Rwanda are similar in terms of their 
economies (largely agricultural, with little manufacturing industry), levels of poverty and 
economic growth, population densities, rates of urban growth and levels of urbanisation.
4
 The 
political regimes in place also have a shared background: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
in Rwanda literally formed inside the Ugandan National Resistance Movement (NRM), and 
both came to power through protracted guerrilla struggle after devastating periods of civil 
conflict (Green, 2011; Waugh, 2004).
5
 The cities themselves, too, are similar: Kampala is 
certainly larger, but by 2010 both were cities of around 1-2 million inhabitants located in 
infrastructurally-challenging terrain of hills and swamps, sharing tropical climates and having 
little by way of formal employment. 
 
The specific research methods used in this study were in keeping with common prescriptions 
about case study research and the need to triangulate findings using multiple data sources 
(Cresswell, 1998; Gerring, 2007; Yin, 1994). The most important method was semi-
structured interviewing, which encompassed over one hundred respondents including local 
and national politicians, bureaucrats, planners and building inspectors, construction workers, 
business and donor representatives, investors and property developers, members of civic 
associations and evictees from urban settlements.
6
 These were undertaken during six months 
of fieldwork between January 2009 and December 2011. Interviewees were selected through 
snowballing and purposively, in order to explore a wide range of opinions and perspectives 
on the issues in question and piece together causal processes. Multiple and dissenting sources 
were always sought for any evidence that is presented in support of particular facts. 
Alongside interviewing, some archival research was undertaken in city government and 
national archives, as well as an extensive review of relevant press coverage on issues relating 
to urban planning, development regulation, construction and expropriation over a five-year 
period.  
 
In Sections 4 and 5, the formal institutional framework is briefly outlined in each city 
followed by an examination of three key areas of urban development control. These are the 
protection of wetlands and other open spaces, which constitutes an important barometer of 
urban land-use regulation; the enforcement of building regulations for commercial 
developments in the city centre (focusing particularly on hotels, which are often linked to 
elite interests and occupy large plots of prime urban land, making them an interesting 
reflection of how planning and regulatory regimes function); and general patterns of planning 
and development regulation in residential areas.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 (UN-HABITAT, 2011; UNPD, 2009) World Bank indicators http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed July 31, 
2012) 
5
 Important differences do of course exist between the countries: the experience of British versus Belgian 
colonialism, the unusual scale and trauma of the genocide in Rwanda, and differences in degree of political 
space being prominent among them. However, perfect similarity on all variables but one is of course impossible 
in the real world, and it is precisely the significance of these differences for urban development that this research 
aims to tease out.   
6
 Most identities have been anonymized due to the sensitive nature of certain subjects or at the request of 
interviewees. 
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4. Kampala: ‘Everyone does whatever they want’ 
 
4.1 Institutional framework for planning and regulation 
 
In Uganda under President Museveni’s NRM, which has held power since 1986, the 
contemporary framework for urban development control is rooted in various key pieces of 
national legislation. Some date from the colonial or immediate post-colonial era but most 
were passed during the NRM’s reorganization and decentralization of state institutions in the 
1990s and 2000s. This include the following: the Town and Country Planning Act (1951; 
revised 1964); the Public Health Act (1969); the Constitution (1995); the National 
Environment Statute (1995); the Local Government Act (LGA, 1997); the Land Act (1998); 
the Physical Planning Act (2010) and the Kampala Capital City Act (2010).
7
 At the city level, 
since 1994 the Canadian-designed Kampala Structure Plan has in theory guided the city’s 
development; urban development regulations were laid out in annexes to this, but as of 2010 
were being repackaged under a forthcoming Building Control Bill. A new Master Plan was 
also in the pipeline.  
 
Formal procedures for gaining permission to build were decentralized to Kampala City 
Council (KCC) and its five city Divisions. Urban development control was specified as 
taking place through six detailed steps, which involved obtaining clearance regarding the 
registered ownership of the land and getting approval for plans at the level of the Division 
and City Council from various political, technical and environmental committees.
8
 Yet 
despite a rigorous institutional framework, planning was barely implemented and regulations 
constantly undermined in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Some observers 
suggest that this is due to the preponderance of private land ownership in the city (MoLG, 
2006; RoU, 1992). However, while it was true that in the colonial period privately-owned 
areas were largely ignored by British planning efforts, to attribute a lack of contemporary 
urban development control to the prevalence of private land is unsatisfactory. The 
implementation of urban plans on private land is amply facilitated by provisions in the 
Constitution, Town and Country Planning Act, Land Acquisition Act, and Kampala Capital 
City Act, which allow government to expropriate land in the interests of public safety and 
development. Moreover, urban development regulations apply to all land, regardless of 
ownership or tenure system, and regulatory breaches are extremely common on public land, 
as demonstrated below. 
 
The problem in contemporary Kampala is therefore a failure of regulatory enforcement on all 
land, private and public. In the words of one former local politician, ‘the land issue is not a 
problem, but the problem is lack of enforcement of policies…everybody does whatever he 
wants…the city is just developing.’9 A government official likewise affirmed that ‘we have 
adequate laws in this country to help proper planning…the problem is enforcement and lack 
of will’.10 To get to the root of the interests at play and why the ‘will’ is not there, we need to 
examine what caused specific failures of urban development control. These are not in short 
supply.  
 
                                                          
7
 This latter bill, which ushered in some important changes to local governance in Kampala (see Goodfellow and 
Titeca, 2012), was passed just after the period of research so will not be discussed here.   
8
 Interview with senior government official, Kampala, January 20, 2010; interview with urban planner, 
Kampala, October 5, 2009. 
9
 Interview with former local politician, Kampala, September 29, 2009. 
10
 Interview with local government official, Kampala, October 8, 2009.  
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4.2. The impotence of regulations in the ‘scramble’ for urban land 
 
Some of the most striking examples of regulatory failure from 2005-10 took place in the 
city’s few open green spaces.  One particularly striking example was that of Centenary Park, 
Kampala’s only public park which by the middle of the 2000s had long been neglected and 
was considered a hideout for criminals. In 2005, Sarah Kizito – wife of an NRM city 
Councillor, Godfrey Nyakana – was given a ten-year lease by KCC to manage the park, with 
the specific remit to plant trees and preserve the environmental ecosystem. The beautification 
of the park was supposed to take place in accordance with strict regulations, one of which 
was that no permanent buildings were to be erected other than washrooms.
11
 In marked 
contrast to the approved plans, Kizito fenced off the park and proceeded to construct 
permanent buildings. ‘All those structures on Centenary Park were built contrary to our 
consent’, one local planning source affirmed.12 Several attempts were made to halt 
construction, but ‘intimidation was used’, and KCC found itself unsupported by central 
government. In the end, the Council attempted to take Kizito to court, but the case was 
withdrawn ‘on instruction from His Excellency the President.’13 Others confirmed that 
Nyakana directed that the court case be halted, with Museveni’s support.14 After the 
construction work finished it was no longer a park at all but a complex of restaurants and bars 
popular with the elite and middle class.  
 
The sole children’s playground in the city centre was also sold off, and without passing 
through any of the planning or regulatory channels was by 2009 being developed into shops. 
The developers in this case were mostly veteran soldiers. More generally, veterans were said 
to have ‘taken most of the open spaces. They come and sit on them, construct their makeshift 
buildings …without any guided development control whatever’. As former soldiers, these 
people are ‘untouchable’, with ‘blessing from high authorities’.15 The bond between army 
veterans and top NRM cadres was very strong, even after years of peace and demobilization: 
veterans claimed to be ‘strange squatters of the ruling party.’ Were it not for the blessing 
from above, one interviewee noted, ‘it would be easy’ to remove them.16  
 
Meanwhile wetland areas, gazetted as ‘inalienable environmental zones’ in 1995 
(Nkurunziza, 2006: 178), were also being built on illegally. Kampala’s Nakivubo channel, an 
artery running through the city performing a vital drainage function and carrying stormwater 
and wastewater towards Lake Victoria, was progressively encroached upon by hotels and 
industrial enterprises. The city planning committee tried to stop the construction of a roofing 
factory on the channel, for example, but failed: ‘they are a big organization with big 
personnel…so they just went ahead and continued’, noted one member. Even industries not 
actually in wetlands were said to ‘break all the rules’ on waste, often discharging it illegally 
into the wetland areas. The problem of polluting industries sited too close to housing was also 
widespread.
17
 
 
                                                          
11
 ‘Centenary Park Fenced Off’, The New Vision, July 29, 2005; Interview with planning official, Kampala, 
October 5, 2009.  
12
 Interview with local politician, Kampala, January 6, 2010.  
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Interview with building inspector, Kampala, January 19, 2010.  
15
 Interview with local politician, Kampala, January 6, 2010. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid; interview with independent planning consultant, Kampala, September 18, 2009.  
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Even more prevalent than contravention of land use laws has been the construction of 
buildings flouting other basic regulations such as those concerning height, distance from the 
road, connection to drainage, provision of parking, fire escapes, and disability access. 
Upmarket hotels have been major culprits: for example the construction of the Imperial 
Royale Hotel, one of a chain of hotels owned by property mogul Karim Hirji, a key NRM 
supporter,
18
 commenced despite its plans being flatly rejected by KCC. Hirji’s architects ‘had 
proposed…several extensions protruding and going straight into the road’. Although not 
approved by the committee, ‘the developer was adamant’ because the high authorities ‘bless 
him whatever he is doing’. Consequently he just ‘started building without approval’, resulting 
in a hotel that ‘is more or less in the middle of the road.’19 While this illegal construction was 
going on, inspectors’ access to the site was extremely difficult. An inspector confirmed that 
the developer’s armed guards were under strict instruction not to ‘allow anyone to access the 
site without the client present’, which he almost never was.20  
 
The role of politicians looms large in many of these failures of regulatory enforcement. In 
early 2009 the Minister of Local Government, Kahinda Otafiire, performed an extraordinary 
U-turn that aptly illustrates the likely informal bargaining at play. In December 2008 he had 
publicly condemned KCC for allowing the construction of shopping arcades in breach of 
regulations, announcing that he was giving them until January to ensure the necessary 
alterations were made, or would dismiss senior KCC staff.
21
 In response, on January 2
nd
 KCC 
produced a list of 48 commercial buildings they discovered were contravening basic 
regulations, including on parking. The Council then demanded that all these developers 
convert the relevant areas back into parking spaces or face closure, giving them a 28 day 
ultimatum. However, shortly after this announcement was made, Otafiire ordered that all 
action against these buildings be halted until a ‘harmonized position’ between the developers 
and KCC was reached. ‘Even before fourteen days had elapsed [he] came in and said “stop”’, 
recalls a KCC source. ‘That’s what I call political interference.’22  
 
No further public explanation was made and as of a year later there was no progress towards 
a ‘harmonized position’; the subject appeared to be closed. When asked why this complete U-
turn had come about, city planning officials responded in euphemisms, stating that the 
developers had ‘persuaded Otafiire to change his mind’, or that the developers managed to 
‘get sympathy’ from central government politicians. One added that ‘once [politicians] 
defend those private developers they expect something in return’.23 As if the regulatory 
enforcement situation was not already bad enough, this event set a new precedent, one 
official explained, rendering it even harder to enforce regulations thereafter.
24
  
 
In all, around 50% of the buildings in Kampala’s CBD were in breach of basic regulations, 
with more appearing all the time. According to virtually all sources interviewed, this was 
emphatically not because of a weak legal and regulatory framework or overriding lack of 
bureaucratic capacity. The primary reason lay in the blockage of implementation by 
politicians. As a former Chief Town Planner for Kampala explained:  
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‘We have building codes, we have many regulations and urban bylaws, but they are flouted 
with impunity. Somewhere some politician, a councillor will come and say ‘you leave that to 
me, I’ll handle it…and that’s the end of it…you’ll never get to stop it now. It gets worse and 
worse. You can go and stop construction on a building site, but the next day you’ll go back, 
you’ll find guards there, with guns.’25  
 
Political interference was ‘like a tradition’ in Kampala,26 one local opposition politician 
explained, often rendering the work of local officials virtually impossible. This is not to deny 
that corruption among KCC officials was also a problem; it clearly was, often leading to the 
converse situation whereby developers connived with senior officials to block planning 
efforts by local political actors. However, this mostly affected local politicians who were 
members of opposition parties. KCC officials with authority bestowed on them by central 
government (for example the Town Clerk) could easily override local opposition 
politicians.
27
 Essentially, whether being made by politicians or bureaucrats, most 
interventions that impeded urban development control were linked to the political and 
economic interests of the NRM and individuals associated with it.  
 
4.3 Slums, anti-planning and Uganda’s ‘untouchables’ 
 
The failure to enforce construction and land use regulations was also a feature of residential 
areas, both in poor neighbourhoods and wealthy ones. Regarding the latter, a neighbourhood 
called Muyenga, long favoured by elites, became known as the ‘rich man’s slum’ due to 
grand houses built with virtually no planning, often over previously-existing roads.
28
 Steep 
slopes had combined with heavy erosion from poor drainage and excavations for further 
construction, resulting in ‘toppling’: the falling away of the hill’s earth, which given a major 
environmental shock would probably cause catastrophic building collapses.
29
 The absence of 
planning in the city’s many and vast low-income settlements was predictably even more 
severe. In part, this was due the local state’s paucity of financial and technical resources. For 
example in Kawempe Division, which houses some of Kampala’s worst slums, there were 
just two people working on issues of planning and building control in 2010 for an area 
housing some 300,000 people. The Division Chairman, a member of the opposition 
Democratic Party, reported ‘huge problems of illegal construction of all kinds’ that he was 
powerless to control, which also made infrastructure provision extremely challenging.
30
  
 
Notwithstanding these capacity problems, political negotiation of a sort was also at play 
regarding planning and regulatory failures in slum areas. This was different from the behind-
the-scenes arrangements between politicians and economic elites discussed above, reflecting 
more diffuse, longer-term and sometimes unspoken pacts between politicians and the urban 
poor.  A KCC planner noted that the council was not lacking the technical capacity to 
demolish and upgrade many slum settlements, but that ‘these dilapidated housing structures 
belong to people you may find difficult to touch’ because they are ‘powerful in their own 
way’ (quoted in Nawangwe and Nuwagaba, 2002: 109). Whether the ethnic kin of political 
elites, former soldiers or just large groups of potential voters, it was possible for the poor as 
well as the wealthy to be ‘untouchable’ – a term often used in Uganda to describe groups of 
people who are effectively exempt from regulations.  
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This ‘power’ of ordinary people to provoke interventions shielding them from efforts to 
shape urban space is also well-illustrated by the case of a dilapidated Kampala housing estate 
(Nakawa-Naguru), where for almost a decade 300 residents resisted eviction and stalled a 
major proposed residential development through petitioning politicians, despite the fact that 
the land in question was state-owned.
31
 Reflecting on this saga, one political commentator 
noted that when it comes to issues such as eviction, Museveni ‘becomes jittery’ because of 
his fear of actively antagonising any constituency.
32
 Under these conditions, for better or 
worse many urban plans simply never get off the ground. 
 
The manifest interest on the part of many state actors in not implementing particular projects 
or enforcing development regulations can be understood as a feature of the political 
bargaining environment in the city. Crucial in this regard is the fact that since Uganda’s 
decentralisation programme in the 1990s and the opening of multiparty politics in 2005, an 
opposition party (the Democratic Party) had come to dominate the City Council.  This 
fundamentally shaped the bargaining environment in two critical ways. On the one hand, it 
exacerbated permissiveness on the part of the central government regarding the contravention 
of planning and regulation by economic elites. This can be understood both in terms of 
keeping NRM allies content through allowing them to pursue lucrative developments but 
also, in the view of some, deliberately creating a situation that would discredit the opposition-
run city council as useless and corrupt.
33
  
 
Equally important, however, was the way in which opposition popularity in the city, 
combined with a highly decentralised system in which central government was jealous of 
powers it had ceded to KCC, led central government politicians to engage with the urban 
poor by ‘protecting’ them from the local state and thereby securing their support as a political 
resource. This reflects quite different processes from the economic corruption among elites 
that also impeded planning. Yet while ‘anti-planning’ interventions by politicians and 
bureaucrats may have had varying motivations, they combined to have a powerful aggregate 
effect on the incentives both to enforce and comply with formal rules. Ultimately, each 
instance of an overruled regulation or disregarded plan reminded the urban population that 
the government was happy to waive formal rules in their favour. This affected the credibility 
of the whole framework for urban development control, to the extent that even major 
developers in the city made little attempt to disguise their flagrant disregard for it. It also 
meant that politicians were increasingly seeking legitimacy with social groups through ‘anti-
planning’ interventions, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of ineffective urban development 
control.  
 
5. Kigali: ‘We are all impaled on the Master Plan’34 
 
5.1. Institutional framework for planning and regulation 
 
On coming to power after the 1994 genocide, the RPF found a virtual vacuum of legislation 
pertaining to urban development (MININFRA, 2008: 19). Due to overwhelming security 
concerns, questions of how to manage and plan cities were barely addressed until around 
2000, when a raft of policy documents and new legislation appeared in rapid succession. 
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Particularly relevant here are the National Decentralisation Policy (2001); the National Land 
Policy (2004); the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2007); and the 
National Urban Housing Policy (2008). Central pieces of legislation include the Organic 
Land Law (2005); the Kigali City Law (2005); and the Expropriation Law (2007). At the city 
level, the American-Singaporean designed Kigali Conceptual Master Plan was published in 
2007, with the Rwanda Building Control Regulations following in 2009. As in Kampala, 
against this institutional backdrop there was a detailed and similarly decentralized process for 
obtaining building permits, involving scrutiny by a range of political and bureaucratic actors. 
On completion it was necessary to obtain an occupation permit, after which no-one was 
allowed to renovate or change the building’s original design or structure without permission 
(MININFRA, 2009).  
 
Kigali at the turn of the century was described as being ‘like Kampala’ in terms of its poor 
planning and unenforced development regulation.
35
 With the introduction of this new 
framework, however, there really was a marked change with regard to enforcing urban order, 
paralleling the broader drive towards the re-engineering of rural society (Ansoms, 2008; 
Newbury, 2011; Van Leeuwen, 2001). The Master Plan was not taken lightly and was in 
constant use as a framework for action. This is not to imply that illegal construction ceased 
entirely, but evidence suggests two major differences from Kampala. First, illegal 
construction clearly declined very significantly as the decade wore on. Even basic 
observations around the city underscored the plausibility of the claim that illegal construction 
had reduced ‘radically and abruptly’ by 2009.36 Second, corrective state action was the rule, 
rather than the exception, when illegal construction was discovered. A fixed procedure was in 
place: the planning office first wrote the developer a letter; if this failed they issued a fine; 
and if fines were not paid and the contravention was substantial, they asked the developer to 
destroy the building, backed up by the threat of government demolition.
37
 As the following 
sections testify, there was ample evidence that these procedures and the regulations 
underpinning them were widely implemented.  
 
5.2. Regulatory rule in Kigali: bulldozers and precedents  
 
One of the sharpest contrasts between the two cities in recent years has been the relative 
protection of wetlands in Kigali vis-à-vis the encroachment experienced in Kampala. In 2006, 
the Rwandan government commissioned a technical map of city wetlands showing 
ecologically sensitive zones. Construction of any kind within twenty metres of designated 
wetlands was prohibited, and government policy was to rehabilitate wetlands previously 
converted to other uses. In 2008, many houses previously built on them were demolished. 
Plans were also underway to move the city’s entire industrial area from the wetland where it 
was built in the 1960s and 1970s to a new industrial park on Kigali’s outskirts.  
 
New acquisitions of land in wetland areas still took place, and developers still applied to 
build there; the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA), however, rejected 
these plans consistently.
38
 There were repeated efforts to try to block the rulings of 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), with some people going ‘to the highest levels’, 
but REMA officials maintained that they had ‘not heard of any of these that have succeeded.’ 
The relative openness of the urban wetlands is striking, which officials believe reflects 
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‘discipline in society’; the importance of orderly development had been emphasized so 
thoroughly that ‘society is beginning to internalize it…the message has gone through and it 
has been accepted’.39 Ironically, while REMA legally had very strong powers, those of its 
equivalent in Uganda (the National Environmental Management Authority, or NEMA) were 
in some respects even stronger. There were strict regulations and codes of practice for EIA 
practitioners in Uganda that Rwanda had yet to establish. However, in contrast to NEMA’s 
failure to act against encroachment or changes of land use whenever wealthy investors (or 
poor ‘untouchables’) were involved, REMA successfully blocked multi-million dollar 
developments in Kigali on environmental grounds.
40
  
 
Meanwhile, Kigali’s burgeoning hotel industry tells a very different story from that described 
in relation to Kampala. Towards the end of the decade, several major new hotels were 
partially demolished by the authorities due to regulatory breaches. One was the Manor Hotel, 
which eventually opened in 2010 after a saga of several years. In 2006, the District 
discovered that the British investor in question was building a commercial property without a 
permit in a residential area, and stopped the construction. The authorities advised that he 
undertake an EIA and noise assessment before construction could be resumed, and then 
eventually allowed construction to continue. The developer, however, then began work on an 
extension intended as a sauna and massage parlour that would generate increased noise, 
vehicles and demands on sewerage, which was not approved or even mentioned in the EIA.
41
 
He made a new application for permission, but continued to build in the meantime. On 
discovering this, the District Authorities wrote to him in January 2009 requesting, in 
accordance with the official procedures, that the unapproved extension be destroyed. ‘We 
gave him the opportunity to destroy it himself’, explained the former mayor, ‘so he could do 
it carefully and recuperate the materials’.42  
 
When the developer refused to take it down, the District Mayor appeared in April with 
bulldozers and demolished the entire extension. This was a remarkable turn of events: the 
hotelier was the single largest British private investor in Rwanda to date, and this was a time 
where the government was working very hard to attract investors.
43
 Moreover, his Rwandese 
wife was very well-connected. The developer ‘tried to use influence’, the District Mayor at 
the time explained:  
 
‘He went to the office of the Prime Minister – the Prime Minister called me on his behalf but I 
explained what was happening. The hotel owner tried to use some relationships he had […] 
his wife is influential. But here if the law is not respected it is not respected…you cannot say 
‘I am friends with the Prime Minister’, or even the Secretary General of the RPF – it doesn’t 
work.’44  
 
Those involved in the hotel project felt that the mayor was inflexible and the delays in 
granting permission inexcusably long.
45
 Nevertheless, the regulations and procedures had 
been made explicit and, delays notwithstanding, the investor did contravene them. Some 
observers suggested that this reflected an underlying arrogance and assumption that when 
doing business in Africa, laws and regulations are infinitely flexible. One noted that the 
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developers ‘were submitting plans after each change was made, building the hotel on an ad 
hoc basis’ as they obtained more funds. Moreover, the District Mayor ‘went down about three 
times and warned them “we have tolerated this so far, this shouldn’t be here”’.46 From her 
perspective, it was critically important not to create ‘a precedent for people to start to 
construct and then ask for a permit.’47  
  
The Mayor’s strictness can partly be explained with respect to powerful mechanisms of 
upward accountability that remain in place despite Rwanda now having a highly  
decentralised system on paper (Purdeková, 2011). Unlike in Kampala, both politicians and 
officials at City and District level believed implementing plans and rigorously enforcing 
regulations was important not only for the city’s development but for their own survival in 
office, indicating that a very different set of incentives was at play. The story of another 
hotel, Golden Hills, confirmed why this belief was well-founded. This hotel was demolished 
on the grounds that it was built secretly, without inspection; therefore it was impossible for 
the authorities to know whether or not it had complied with construction regulations. Despite 
ordering the demolition himself, the Mayor of the relevant District was subsequently forced 
to resign when it transpired that earlier in the year he had known unapproved developments 
were happening but turned a blind eye. It was perceived by central government to be 
suspicious that he did not order the demolition sooner.
48
 This again set an important 
precedent; local officials explained that people in the city council were ‘training themselves’ 
to follow the law to the letter, given that ‘slight things can make you out of office’.49 
Emblematic of the drive against petty corruption for which Rwanda is now well-known, these 
developments are intrinsically linked to the political bargaining environment, as will be 
argued below. 
 
5.3. Planning and the politics of Kigali’s transformation 
 
Given the rates of urban growth in Rwanda, there is inevitably some small-scale illegal 
construction to accommodate the burgeoning urban population. However, it was said that if 
the urban poor constructed anything illegally it was likely to be made of mud due to 
awareness of how soon it would be destroyed.
50
 Local construction workers affirmed this 
trend, with one noting of the regulatory regime that ‘there are people who say it is like 
Europe’.51 The strong hand of the state on illegal construction by the poor is not an 
uncommon phenomenon (Durrand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Payne, 2001; Potts, 2006). 
However, the commitment to a policy of zero tolerance to illegal construction over a 
sustained period (rather than just sporadic crackdowns), including for wealthy investors, is 
more unusual.  
 
There are certainly areas of Kigali that have developed without adequate development control 
since the turn of the millennium; as well as numerous slums, some observers argued that the 
upmarket neighbourhood of Nyarutarama is heading the same way as Muyenga in Kampala, 
with ‘monstrous structures’ encroaching on road reserves.52 However, most observations 
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regarding lax regulation in Kigali were based on the unplanned development that 
characterised the city’s growth until the second half of the 2000s. It seems unquestionable 
that there was a major shift around 2007, and even if not sustained over time, the demolitions, 
wetland evictions and strictness with investors described above did not occur in Kampala at 
any point between the NRM taking power and 2010.  An international investor who had 
previously operated businesses elsewhere in Africa commented on his learning curve:  
 
‘I’ve been learning slowly….you can’t just go and buy a piece of land anywhere and build on 
it…now the Master Plan designates that this will be here and this here… [a Rwandese 
acquaintance from among the elite] is selling [her land] because you can’t build there, they 
won’t allow her. She wants to build a small residential house and they are saying no…that 
area is designated hotels, apartments, high rise.’53  
 
Experiences such as these are commonplace in contemporary Kigali. Moreover, investors 
emphasize the reputation the government has for reneging on major deals at the last minute, 
often because of issues pertaining to land use.
54
 At no point since its inauguration in 1994 had 
Kampala’s Structure Plan been respected to this degree, despite Kampala City Council 
having greater technical capacity in terms of resources and skills (Goodfellow, 2012). To 
understand what is often put down to the greater ‘political will’ of the Rwandan government 
to implement development control, it is critical to examine how the political calculus facing 
state actors differed substantially from that in Uganda.  
 
As an organization perceived as being led by a small minority of foreign-born returnees 
within the already minority Tutsi ethnic group, the RPF has little ‘natural’ legitimacy to draw 
on among the wider Rwandan population (Longman, 2011; Reyntjens, 2004). As such, the 
maintenance of a credible commitment to a tightly-disciplined developmental project is 
critical to regime survival, and urban development control provides a highly visible way for 
the government to demonstrate this. Kigali plays a special role in the government’s vision, 
being viewed by the government as somewhere that must ‘lead’ the rest of the country by 
example.
55
 Moreover, one resource the government does have to draw on is its reputation for 
clamping down on corruption (Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011). While there are certainly 
forms of patronage and patrimonialism in Rwanda (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Green, 
2011), the point is that the highly visible forms of corruption associated with waiving formal 
planning rules for elites in exchange for favours would be politically dangerous in Kigali. 
The importance of the discourse of anti-corruption as a political resource is evident in the 
attitudes of both high-level politicians and lowly state functionaries towards urban 
development regulations.
56
  
 
Meanwhile, the greater constraints on opposition parties in Rwanda,
57
 facilitated to a 
considerable degree by the trauma of genocide and consequent suspicion of organised politics 
(Straus and Waldorf, 2011), also affect the incentives facing political actors. Unlike in 
Kampala, where the relatively real presence of political opposition often leads to politicians 
currying favour by exempting urban poor groups from regulations, the RPF’s dominance 
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affords urban constituents little by way of an ‘exit’ option. Thus as well as it being potentially 
dangerous to engage in visible waiving of formal rules for elites, there is little incentive to 
visibly waive them for the poor in the interests of political gain. Moreover, the predominantly 
expatriate RPF did not socially embed itself among the population during wartime as many 
guerrilla movements (including the NRM) did (Mkandawire, 2002; Prunier, 1998), creating 
few links with the wider population that feed into petty clientelism of the kind observed in 
Kampala.  
 
In short, the relative lack of both opposition and historic linkages means there are very few 
‘untouchables’ in Kigali. This is well illustrated by the speed and seeming ease with which 
the state undertook expropriation of low-income settlements in the name of the Master Plan, 
in marked contrast to Kampala. Evictions were taking place on a large scale in Kigali from 
around 2007-8, when over three hundred households were removed to make way for the 
Master Plan’s proposed new central business district.58 In mid-2009 the government then 
expropriated an entire 140-hectare informal residential area consisting of 3,600 houses of 
varying sizes and standards, for the development of a new ‘satellite town’. This plan was 
remarkably similar to that for the Nakawa-Naguru estates in Kampala, but experienced 
almost none of the politically-motivated obstructions. The relatively effective implementation 
of plans and regulations in Kigali in recent years certainly does not imply that planning was 
inclusive and pro-poor. Important gaps in terms of procedure remained in place by 2011: the 
issue of adequate compensation for expropriated land was an on-going source of controversy 
and the enforcement of the Expropriation Law without accompanying measures and 
procedures constituted a continuing problem.
59
  
 
The political bargaining environment in Kigali was therefore conducive to the effective 
implementation of plans and enforcement of regulations for a number of reasons. First, a key 
political resource mobilised by the RPF regime was its image as an organisation bringing 
order to a country marred by devastating violence and rejecting visible corruption, which 
both incentivised a culture of planning and actively militated against waiving regulatory 
rules. Relatedly, the government lacked the kind of legitimacy that is associated with 
ingratiating itself with groups of the poor and allowing them to evade inconvenient official 
processes; consequently it had neither the option nor the necessity of maintaining clientelistic 
relations of this variety, in contrast with the NRM. Third, long time horizons, engendered 
both by constraints on opposition and a political settlement rooted in long-termist 
‘developmental patrimonialism’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012), likely facilitated a 
degree of tolerance among elites for the short-term sacrifices involved in submitting to urban 
development controls. Finally, a highly centralised political system streamlined relations 
between planners, mayors at the city/district level and the central authorities. These various 
factors tended to feed into one another, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of relatively 
effective urban development control whereby the government’s commitment to 
implementation was both credible and linked to its very legitimacy, enhancing public 
compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
 Interview with former city official, Kigali, December 10, 2009. 
59
 Interviews with community leaders and slum-dwellers evicted from the city centre and relocated to peripheral 
settlements, December 17, 2009. 
18 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has argued that given similar regulations and formal procedures, as well as 
similarly constrained resources, the effectiveness of urban development control in Kigali 
relative to Kampala comes down to their fundamentally different political bargaining 
environments. Throughout the 2000s, in Kampala both elite and popular groups whose 
interests were threatened in the short term by urban plans or regulations could find a 
supporter within a state agency to aid them in exchange for financial or electoral support. As 
a Ugandan government official working on urban issues noted, with one eye on the 
comparison with Rwanda:  
 
‘In Kigali if the City Council has decided to do something, that’s it – you’ll have nowhere to 
run to. But here in Uganda and in Kampala in particular, if a decision is made by Kampala 
City Council and somebody is implementing the contrary, and you try to stop it, they will run 
to another place for support. And they will get the support. KCC will be told ‘please wait. 
Leave that matter. We are investigating’. In the process, the developments are going on – the 
investigation report by that third party will never come out […] if it ever comes up, the 
project will be complete. So it defeats your reasoning and your energies of fighting.’60 
In this way, the constant political interference with the activities of city planners had not only 
direct but indirect effects on the effectiveness of planning, sapping the will of even those 
most committed. In Rwanda, by contrast, failure to address the challenges posed by rapid 
urban growth in a politically volatile, land-scarce and resource-constrained environment was 
perceived as posing a ‘big danger’ by governing elites.61 There was consensus among state 
actors at both the national and city level that implementation of development controls 
mattered – both for the country’s future and for their own career prospects. As with Kampala, 
but in an opposite sense, the willingness of government to enforce its urban plans and codes 
and its ability to do so become intertwined, as incentives for both enforcement by the state 
and compliance by urban-dwellers reinforced one another in a virtuous cycle. 
 
The comparison between urban development control in Kampala and Kigali presented in this 
article might come across as too stark; as unrealistic, even. There were, of course, instances 
of regulated development in Kampala (as suggested by the 50% of buildings not in breach of 
regulations) and of haphazard development in Kigali, particularly regarding construction 
prior to 2007. Yet the comparison appears stark because in the period under consideration – 
the late 2000s – there really was an extraordinary divergence between the two. By 2010, 
newspaper commentaries in Kampala decried the state of the city virtually on a daily basis, 
often contrasting it with Kigali, and regular delegations of Kampala’s politicians and 
bureaucrats made pilgrimages across the border, frequently commenting on their 
‘amazement’ at Kigali’s achievements.62 Elsewhere in the region city planners also look to 
Kigali with deep-seated admiration.63 This article deliberately examined various aspects of 
urban development control rather than one more detailed case study in each city, precisely to 
emphasize that the contrasts do not relate to isolated incidents but rather to wide-ranging, 
systemic differences between the two cities in terms of how urban plans and development 
regulations fared.  
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None of this is to suggest that the extreme nature of the divergence observed here will be 
sustained. In 2011, sweeping institutional changes were introduced in Kampala whereby the 
President empowered a new cadre of bureaucrats led by an appointed ‘Executive Director’ to 
manage the city, substantially disempowering the opposition-led democratic arm of City 
Council (Gore and Muwanga, 2013). This amounts to a fundamental reconfiguring of the 
political bargaining environment, the long-term effects of which are too early to judge. The 
fact that the president has demonstrated this new commitment to the urban problem, and is 
highly supportive of the Executive Director, itself constitutes a major political resource.64 
However, the incentives of frontline state actors to enforce regulations and of urban citizens 
to comply are likely to demonstrate considerable inertia. Meanwhile, for the Rwandan regime 
to realize its urban vision requires both maintaining its existing political resources and 
securing an increasing inflow of financial resources to bring it Master Plan to life, neither of 
which is guaranteed.  
 
Nevertheless, the comparison presented here yields important lessons for the many African 
states in which cities loom increasingly large in the development equation. Critically, it is not 
through foreign expertise, technical capacity-building or rigorous planning and regulatory 
rules on paper that effective urban development control is likely to be achieved. These 
features were present in both cities examined here, and tell us little about the difference in 
outcomes. Rather it is through changes to the political bargaining environment. This is more 
difficult to manipulate than formal policies or technical capacities, and there are important 
normative questions regarding whether and how such manipulation should be attempted. Yet 
the question of how governments, civil society organisations and international donors should 
engage with these politically-driven determinants of urban development outcomes is 
unavoidable for anyone concerned to promote a more effectively managed urban future.   
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